When the so-called “Two Sessions” take place in Beijing – the parallel annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Political Consultative Conference – the Chinese leadership usually presents the political script for the coming years. This spring, however, the script seems unusually ambitious.

In the drafts of the new five-year plan, which is supposed to last until 2030, one term appears more than 50 times: Artificial intelligence. This accumulation alone is a political signal (in the past, words like “reform” or “development” made a career in official statements by the CP in this way). China doesn’t just want to become more digital. It wants to dominate technologically.

The targets are correspondingly bold. By 2027, around 70 percent of the Chinese economy be penetrated by AI applications, even 90 percent by 2030. At the same time, Beijing is defining humanoid robotics as a strategic core industry with the goal of doubling production within five years. Chancellor Merz was able to marvel at a dance performance of such robots during his recent trip to China.

Digital dominance as a reason of state

It also covers communication networks between Earth and space, nuclear fusion schedules and brain-computer interfaces. AI-related industries are expected to grow to a market value of over ten trillion yuan – the equivalent of around $1.38 trillion. This promising announcement is also intended to attract foreign investors.

One might consider this a technocratic modernization agenda. But this plan is more than economic policy. It is, as some observers have already noted, a strategic response to a world in which Beijing expects the conflict with the United States over global leadership to become more intense and severe.

Farewell to the old growth model

The term China’s leadership uses for this course is “new quality productive forces.” Behind the unwieldy expression lies a clear idea: In the future, growth should no longer come from real estate and infrastructure, but from technological sovereignty – i.e. from chips, AI models, robotics and quantum computers. Premier Li Qiang clearly stated this priority in his government report.

The plan fits an economic reality that has become increasingly uncomfortable for the Communist Party. The real estate crisis, an aging population and weak consumption are putting the old growth model under pressure. At the same time, American export controls are forcing China out of key technologies such as high-performance chips.

State-orchestrated innovation

Beijing’s answer is therefore: state-orchestrated innovation. Universities, state-owned corporations and provincial governments are systematically integrated into an AI ecosystem. In Jiangsu Province, for example, there are already more than 1,500 AI companies, while local governments are providing computing capacity and subsidies to accelerate industrial applications.

The geopolitical dimension of this plan is hard to ignore. When Beijing announces that it will take “extraordinary measures” to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors and rare earths, it is not just industrial policy rhetoric. It is a strategic message to the rest of the world, especially to Washington. China already signaled its power in this area last year when exports of rare earths to the USA were delayed and subjected to new controls.

Raw materials as a geopolitical means of pressure

Rare earths are a good example to illustrate China’s strategy. Beijing controls much of the global production and processing of these raw materials, which are essential for electric motors, wind turbines and military technology. Even before last year, in 2010, Beijing used export restrictions on Japan as a political means of pressure. The idea that this card could be played again in geopolitical competition is now also a concern for American strategists.

In any case, the new plan suggests that raw material sovereignty has become just as important as technological independence. Both belong to the same strategic logic: minimize vulnerability. In Washington, the competition with China is often described as a technological rivalry between two innovation systems: Silicon Valley against Shenzhen, venture capital against state capitalism. But this analogy falls short.

A system competition without clear boundaries

Because Beijing’s plan does not follow purely economic rationality. Rather, it is part of a comprehensive national security strategy. In China, industrial policy, military modernization and technological development are increasingly merging into a single agenda.

The West, on the other hand, thinks in separate categories: economy here, security there, research in between. This leads to strategic asymmetry. While the US tries to slow China with export controls, Beijing is mobilizing the entire state system for long-term technological autonomy.

Betting on political will

Therefore, investors need to understand that they can of course invest in Chinese technology companies – through international exchanges, ETFs or specialized funds. But they must be aware that these investments do not work like classic growth bets, but rather are supported and financed by geopolitical decisions: opportunities arise where Beijing provides massive support, for example in AI, chips or robotics. Every investment therefore remains dependent on party decisions, regulatory pushes and whether the strategic rivalry between China and the USA escalates.

Will China achieve all of these goals? Nobody knows. The plan is partly visionary, perhaps even overambitious. Communication between space and the world or industrial humanoid robots cannot be planned by party decision. But the crucial point is different: even if only some of these projects succeed, the global balance of power will change. An economy that is 90 percent AI-supported would generate leaps in productivity that classic industrialized countries can hardly ignore.

The manifesto of a new era

The new five-year plan is therefore no ordinary economic program. It is a strategic manifesto. Or, to put it bluntly: While Europe is still discussing data protection guidelines and arguing with America about tech regulation, China is already planning the industrial infrastructure of an AI civilization.

The question is not whether Beijing will be able to implement its next five-year plan one-to-one or not. The question is whether the West has even understood that it is losing this race that has already begun.