For Michael Hüther, director of the German Economic Institute (IW), the balance sheet of the special infrastructure fund twelve months after its adoption is “rather sobering”.
In one LinkedIn post the economist calculates in detail. Particularly spicy: around 12 billion euros turned out not to be additional investments, but rather standard budget expenditure declared differently. “Even ongoing operating costs, for example in hospitals, were labeled as ‘transformation’ and financed from the special fund,” said Hüther.
Hüther warns: the federal government must significantly increase investments, also because it was promised to the citizens. “Now it’s important,” he writes.
The federal government had planned around 14 billion euros from the special fund in 2025. Investments should have increased by at least the same amount. In fact, they only grew by a good two billion euros – just enough to compensate for inflation.
Investment quota in the core budget missed
According to Hüther’s analysis, the minimum formal requirements were also not met. In order to have access to the special fund at all, the federal government must spend at least ten percent of its regular budget on investments. “In the planning, he barely reached this threshold – but in fact the rate was only 8.7 percent,” said the IW director.
The fundamental problem: “It’s the plan that counts, not the implementation,” Hüther continues.
Hüther accepts a partial apology – but only to a limited extent
The economist admits that the special fund has only actually been available since autumn 2025 and that the outflow of funds into new projects takes time. “However, the experience of previous years would have made more realistic budgeting possible,” he said.
For 2026, the federal government is planning a significant increase in investments to around 120 billion euros. Hüther still sees an opportunity in this: the promise can still be kept.
“Emergency operation” instead of a broad debate about reforming the debt brake
His judgment on the political debate that preceded the special fund is more fundamental. Instead of concrete reform proposals, extreme positions dominated – either the complete retention or the abolition of the debt brake. “Similarly, there was no in-depth debate about meaningful reform,” he complains.
In the end, the centrist political forces anchored two constitutional exceptions in an “emergency operation” – also because many actors had previously refused any serious debate.





