Five scenarios for Donald Trump’s five-day window

Although this surrender did not occur, just three days later the US President said: “I think the war is largely over.” Finally, on Saturday, Trump gave Tehran a 48-hour ultimatum, threatening to massively bomb Iran’s power plants and energy infrastructure, only to suspend it for five days on Monday.

Against the background of Trump’s zigzag course, the following scenarios emerge:

1. Controlled de-escalation and limited deal

The five days will be used by Washington and Tehran to agree a security deal through intermediaries such as Egypt, Turkey and Oman. This deal could include stopping further war escalation by the USA and, in return, a reduction in Iranian counterattacks on targets in the Gulf states allied with the USA. At the same time, the opponents could expect a partial relaxation on and in the Strait of Hormuz agree. That would not be a major peace solution, but rather a frozen interim state.

However, the fact that Trump is publicly playing very high poker and at the same time formulating demands for the extensive dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program speaks against this, while Iran is insisting on guarantees, compensation and an end to the attacks. Trump also spoke again about regime change on Monday. This is precisely why no real breakthrough is to be expected, but rather a minimalist, vague formula is conceivable.

Probability: small amount. But it will grow if Iran is willing to make minimal concessions.

2. US attacks pause, Israel continues military actions

According to Trump’s own account, the five-day break primarily affects US strikes on energy targets. It does not automatically mean a total silence by all warring parties. Israel is not bound by such a pause and could therefore continue the attacks. Politically, that would be attractive for Trump: He could say he was giving diplomacy a chance without completely giving up military pressure.

Probability: quite high. But the scenario is unstable, Israeli attacks continued and so did Iran’s counterstrikes.

3. Washington is also forcing Israel to take a short breather

That would be the most strategically logical option: America tries to bring Israel into line for a few days in order to diplomatically test whether Iran shows any verifiable movement on Hormuz, rocket fire and nuclear issues.

The logic behind this would be: get out together now, but with the clear announcement that we will strike back in a coordinated manner later if there is a renewed rearmament or new attacks or in the event of no Iranian concessions. This suggests that the USA is looking for an alternative path in view of oil prices, markets and regional risks.

Probability: small amount. Israel’s strategic interest lies in continuing military actions.

4. Iran escalates so much that Trump quickly ends the pause

In Tehran’s propaganda there is again a lot of talk about fighting at all costs, which doesn’t sound like a willingness to interrupt the war. But: Tehran is likely to be militarily exhausted – and it could propagandistically present the pause as an American retreat in order to gain time militarily.

A major counteroffensive within those five days would deprive Iran of the diplomatic argument that Washington caused the escalation. More likely would be a calibrated continuation of Tehran’s aggression via proxies (like Hezbollah), pinpricks or limited strikes, not maximum escalation. Because that would allow Trump to quickly switch back to massive air strikes.

Probability: very low. Iran would risk much and gain nothing by escalating the war against the United States and its allies.

5. Brief relative calm – then resumption of fighting

The break could pass without changing anything in the long term. These days there would be fewer immediate US strikes, a little less market panic, hectic mediation via Oman, Turkey, Egypt or Pakistan – and then it continues because the core questions such as ending Tehran’s nuclear program and, above all, regime change remain insoluble.

Trump speaks of progress, Iran denies direct talks, the demands of both sides are far apart, and military preparations continue in the background. Then the five days would be less of a possible peace window than an operational interruption.

Probability: quite high

Long term: war of attrition like in Iraq or Vietnam

A direct comparison with Iraq, Vietnam or Afghanistan is historically lopsided, but the mechanics of sliding into a long war of attrition are real. First you have limited goals, then you suffer your own losses, then you deploy more troops and keep giving new mission reasons.

If the five days are just a break before a new phase, the war could tip into an open, expensive, asymmetrical permanent state. It wouldn’t be a classic invasion, but it would be a constant mix of air warfare, naval operations, proxy warfare and political attrition.

Probability: growing